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Abstract.  This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms 
who compete in a market after the auction.  Firms have different costs, and cost 
efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage.  
If only one license is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the 
auction (license) as it will get the highest profit in the aftermarket, i.e., it has the highest 
valuation for the license.  This paper argues that this result does not generalize to the 
case of multiple licenses and aftermarket competition.  In particular, we determine 
conditions under which auctions may select inefficient firms and therefore lead to an 
inefficient allocation of resources.  Strategic interactions in the aftermarket, in particular 
firms’ preferences to compete with the least cost-efficient firms rather than with the 
most efficient firms, are responsible for our result. 
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1. Introduction 
In many liberalization or privatization projects, governments eventually face the issue 
how to select firms that will provide the formerly publicly provided service.  One of the 
advantages of using auctions as a selection mechanism, so it is often thought, is that 
auctions select the most cost-efficient firms.  Markets where more cost-efficient firms 
are active typically yield more efficient market outcomes than when these same markets 
are served by less cost-efficient firms, i.e., other things being equal cost-efficiency is 
good for overall economic welfare.  One forceful statement of this view is by Demsetz 
(1968).  Demsetz argues that competition for the market may be a good substitute for 
competition in the market.  Moreover, in a monopoly context he argues that the most 
cost-efficient firm will win the competition for the market (read: will win the auction).  
In this paper, we will refer to this result as the monopoly result of Demsetz.  This result 
has permeated a large literature on procurement issues and, indeed, Laffont and Tirole 
(2002, pp. 307-8) state that if one ignores the processing, capture and dynamic costs of 
auctions, it is easy to see that auctions typically select the firm with the lowest cost. 
Recently, many governments have relied on a combination of competition for and 
competition in the market. An important case in point is the wave of 3G mobile 
telephony spectrum auctions that have been held around the world (see, e.g., Klemperer 
2002a, 2002b, Binmore and Klemperer 2002, and Jehiel and Moldovanu 2004 for 
overviews).  In all of the 3G auctions, multiple licenses were sold and as there were 
more firms participating in the auction than available licenses, firms had to compete to 
obtain a license.  Many governments formally or informally stated that efficient 
assignment of frequency spectrum was one of the goals to be achieved.  With cost 
asymmetries between firms, efficient assignment implies that the most cost-efficient 
firms should win licenses, and indeed the Dutch government, among others, mentioned 
selecting the most efficient firms as one of the reasons for holding an auction (see, e.g., 
Janssen et al. 2001). 
In this paper, we will argue however that the monopoly result of Demsetz does not 
carry over to the case of multiple licenses, i.e., to the case where firms compete in an 
oligopolistic fashion in the aftermarket.  In particular, there are market conditions under 
which the most cost-efficient firms will not necessarily obtain the licenses, or even 
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worse, that the least cost-efficient firms will necessarily secure them.  The main reason 
that the Demsetz result does not generalize is that in an auction with multiple licenses, a 
strategic effect works against the Demsetz result.  Basically, the strategic effect is 
present in almost all market settings as it simply confirms the fact that any firm prefers 
to compete with high-cost firms rather than with low-cost firms.  Depending on the 
market conditions and the ex-ante distribution of firms’ costs, the strategic effect can be 
so strong that the most cost-efficient firms make less profit in the aftermarket when they 
compete with each other than the least cost-efficient firms do. 
More technically, we consider a standard multi-unit uniform-price auction where 
firms have private information about their costs, and overall economic efficiency 
requires the most efficient firms to win the auction.  A strategy for the firms is a 
function specifying how a firm’s bid depends on its efficiency parameter.  The 
generalization of the Demsetz monopoly result to the case where multiple licenses are 
auctioned requires that the more efficient a firm is, the higher it bids in the auction, i.e., 
there should exist a monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium where firms’ bidding 
strategy is increasing in their efficiency parameter.  We identify conditions under which 
such a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium exists and when it does not exit. 
A first, more easily identifiable condition under which a symmetric increasing 
bidding equilibrium fails to exist is that firms’ efficiency parameters are positively 
correlated (affiliated) so that learning one’s own efficiency parameter provides 
information about other firms’ private information.  In practice, positive affiliation of 
firms’ efficiency parameters may naturally arise in sectors where firms use similar 
production technologies and prices of inputs fluctuate with (macroeconomic) shocks 
that are common to all firms.  Alternatively, firms may implement cost-saving 
technologies that arise from an exogenous stochastic process.  In both cases, if a firm is 
more cost-efficient itself, it infers that all other firms are more cost-efficient as well.  
Therefore, more efficient firms expect to be competing with other efficient firms (who 
are known to be fierce competitors) and thus expect to make less profit in the 
aftermarket than less efficient firms.2  We will show, that for any oligopolistic market, 
no matter how weak the strategic effect is, there are distributions of firms’ types for 
which a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist. 
                                                                          
2 In other words, in an increasing bidding equilibrium there is a kind of winner’s curse or adverse 
selection effect present, the strength of which depends on the type of bidder.  Bidders optimally “adjust” 
their bids for this effect and as the effect is stronger for more efficient firms, highly efficient firms may 
“adjust” their bid so much that the increasing bidding equilibrium strategy is destroyed. 
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A second, more surprising condition under which a symmetric increasing bidding 
equilibrium fails to exist is where firms’ efficiency parameters are ex-ante independent.  
Despite firms’ types being ex-ante independent, the types of firms that win licenses will 
be correlated.  This is so because all winning firms outbid the firm with the highest 
loosing bid.  As this ex post form of positive correlation (affiliation) actually is the only 
correlation that is relevant for determining the optimal bidding strategy, the intuitive 
reason for the nonexistence of a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium is then the 
same as above.  We will show that in this case of statistically independent types an 
increasing equilibrium fails to exist only if the strategic effect is sufficiently strong. 
When one of these two conditions holds, a symmetric increasing bidding 
equilibrium does not exist.  This implies that only (i) asymmetric equilibria exist in 
which different firms have different bidding functions, or (ii) the equilibrium bidding 
functions are not monotone, or (iii) firms use random bidding strategies, or (iv) a 
decreasing equilibrium exists.  In all of these four cases, there is at least a positive 
probability that less efficient firms will bid more than more efficient firms and therefore 
obtain the licenses.  Thus, if firms’ types are highly correlated, or the strategic effect is 
strong enough, the overall outcome is inefficient with positive probability.3
We also show, by means of an example, that if firms’ types are correlated and the 
strategic effect is strong enough, a unique monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium is 
decreasing.  In this case, auctions always select the least efficient firms implying lower 
overall welfare than any other selection mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the two-stage 
model with an auction stage and a market competition stage.  In Section 3 we then 
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing equilibrium to exist and 
illustrate what these general conditions imply in case of Bertrand and Cournot 
competition in the aftermarket.  Then, in section 4, we provide an example in which a 
unique monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium exists and that it is decreasing.  
Section 5 concludes and provides a discussion of related literature and remaining issues.  
The appendix contains all proofs. 
                                                                          
3 There are now many papers studying inefficiencies created by auctions due to aftermarket competition. 
For a recent overview, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006).  Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) focus on 
the interaction between incumbents and entrants, Janssen (2006) considers how auctions may lead to 
coordination in the market stage and Janssen and Karamychev (2006) study selection effects in markets 
where demand uncertainty is important. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and 
Stacchetti (1996) show that even when one license is auctioned, inefficiencies may arise due to the 
existence of externalities between the bidders. 
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2. The Model 
Access to the aftermarket is limited to the firms that have obtained licenses to operate in 
the market.  The government allocates  licenses in a multi-unit auction to the 
highest bidding firms, and we assume that  firms participate in the auction.  
In the oligopolistic aftermarket, firms compete by simultaneously choosing a value of 
the strategic variable s.  Depending on the market, we can interpret s as either a price p 
or a quantity q, or any other relevant strategic variable.  The profit πi of firm i is 
determined by the level of s that firm i and the other (n - 1) firms choose, and by the 
firm’s efficiency parameter ei.  As we assume that πi is symmetric in all sj for 
2≥n
( )1+n
i
≥N
j ≠ , it 
can be written as 
( )iiii ess ,, −= ππ , 
where s-i is a vector of strategic variables chosen by all other firms.  To shorten 
notation, we denote the partial derivatives of π as follows: 
ii s∂∂≡ /ππ , jj s∂∂≡ /ππ  for ij ≠ , ie e∂∂≡ /ππ , , etc. jiii ss ∂∂∂≡ /2, ππ
The efficiency parameter ei positively influences the profit of firm i by reducing its total 
as well as marginal costs.  Therefore, for a typical cost function f(e, q) of a firm we will 
have: 
( ) 0, <qefe , , and . ( ) 0, >qefq ( ) 0,, <qef qe
When firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition), si = qi and firms’ profit 
function is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )iij jiiii qefqpqeqq ,,, −= ∑−π , 
so that 0>−= ee fπ  and 0,, >−= qeei fπ .  When firms compete in prices (differentiated 
Bertrand competition), si = pi and firms’ profit function is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )iiiiiiiii ppqefpppqepp −−− −= ,,,,,π , 
where  is firm i‘s market demand, so that ( ii ppq −, ) 0>−= ee fπ  and 0,, <−= iqeei qfπ . 
In order to ensure the existence, uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium in 
the aftermarket, firms’ marginal profit function must satisfy a stability requirement.  We 
follow Bulow et al. (1985) and assume in the case of strategic complements, where 
0, >jiπ , that ( ) 0,, <+∑ ≠ik kiii ππ  and in case of strategic substitutes, where 0, <jiπ , 
that ( ) 0,, <− jiii ππ . 
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We analyze the case where the government organizes a multi-unit uniform-price 
auction to allocate the n licenses, where all the winning firms pay the same license fee 
w, which is equal to the highest non-winning bid.  This uniform-price auction allows us 
to simplify the exposition of results while keeping the formulation of the aftermarket 
competition stage quite general.  In the main body of the paper we assume that resale of 
licenses is not allowed.  In the final section, we discuss how allowing for different 
auction formats and resale of licenses after the auction will affect our results. 
A firm’s efficiency parameter ei, i.e., the type of firm i, is its private information in 
the auction stage.  The prior joint distribution of types is denoted by F(ei, e-i).  This 
distribution has a finite support [ ee, ], and is assumed to be weakly affiliated (thus 
allowing for statistical independence).  A firm i submits a bid bi based on ei.  We denote 
a monotone symmetric equilibrium bidding function by b(e), so that firm i bids b(ei) in 
equilibrium. 
Depending on what information is revealed immediately after the auction is held, 
three different scenarios can be considered: 
a) A private information scenario, where neither firms’ types nor the winning bids 
become public. 
b) An imperfect information scenario, where only the bids of the winning firms but 
not their types become public. 
c) A full information scenario, where types of all winning firms become public. 
In what follows, we mainly focus on the private information scenario.  The imperfect 
information scenario is too complicated to analyze as signaling issues significantly 
complicate firms’ bidding behavior.  As each firm has an incentive to pretend to be 
more efficient than it actually is, the auction stage would have to be analyzed as an N 
firm signaling game with each player being a sender and a potential receiver of signals.4  
The full information scenario, on the other hand, does not seem to be realistic.  
Moreover, this scenario can be analyzed in a similar way to the private information 
scenario, as we will briefly indicate in footnote 5 below. 
In the private information scenario, a type ei paying a license fee w and choosing si 
in the aftermarket has an expected market profit conditional on winning the auction of 
                                                                          
4 Goeree (2003) contains an analysis of how single-agent signaling affects bidding behavior in auctions. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )kliiii ebwebeessE <≤− ,,,π , 
where we indicate all winning firms other than firm i by the index k and all loosing 
firms by index l.  Maximizing expected profit with respect to si and assuming that all 
other winning firms choose sk optimally yields the first-order conditions defining firms’ 
aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy.  In case the bidding function b(e) monotonically 
increases, we denote it as b(+)(e), and write these first-order conditions as follows: 
( )( )kliiiii ezeeessE <≤= − ,,,0 **π , , ni ,,1K=
where z denotes the type of firm that submits the nth highest bid among (N – 1) firms 
other than firm i determining the license fee w, i.e., w = b(+)(z).  Under the assumptions 
that we made about the profit function ( iii ess ,, − )π , these first-order conditions uniquely 
define a market stage Nash equilibrium strategy . ( )zess ii ,* =
3. When an increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist 
We are now ready to analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing 
symmetric bidding equilibrium to exist.  We first derive these conditions for the general 
case described in the previous section.  Then we analyze two sets of circumstances 
(firms’ types being independently distributed, and affiliated types) under which the 
necessary conditions cannot be satisfied so that the auction stage does not have an 
increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium.  With independent types, we also indicate 
what these conditions imply in case of Bertrand and Cournot competition. 
Let b(+)(e) be an increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding function and 
 be the corresponding firms’ aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy.  
Denoting a firm’s reduced-form profit by 
( zess ii ,* = )
( )zee ii ,, −π , i.e., 
( ) ( )iiiii esszee ,,,, ** −− ≡ ππ , 
allows us to write the expected profit of type x conditional on getting a license as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )kliii ezexezeeEzxv <≤=≡ −+ ,,,, π . 
The function v(+)(x, z) is a firm’s valuation function, which is used in the auction stage 
to determine the optimal bidding strategy.  The following proposition derives an 
equilibrium bidding function and necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing 
symmetric bidding equilibrium to exist. 
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Proposition 1.  If  and  for all ( ) 0>+xv
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, >+ ++ eeveev zx [ ]eee ,∈ , then there exists 
a unique symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium given by b(+)(e) = v(+)(e, e).  If the 
equilibrium exists, then  and  for all ( )+ ( ) ( )++( ) 0, ≥eevx ( ) ( ) 0,, ≥+ eeveev zx [ ]eee ,∈ . 
The statements made in Proposition 1 can be understood as follows.  Suppose that x = z.  
In other words, suppose that firm i and another firm, let us say firm m, have the same 
type, i.e., , so that they together determine the auction price w, and ek >z 
for all other winning firms k.  In this case, firms i and m compete for only one 
remaining license.  They will bid their entire expected market profits v(+)(z, z), so that 
the equilibrium bidding function b(+)(e) must satisfy b(+)(z) = v(+)(z, z). 
mi ezxe ===
Suppose now that x is marginally larger than z.  Then, in order to get a license, firm 
i must get a marginally higher expected profit v(+)(x, z) than firm m, so that firm i can 
bid marginally higher than firm m.  Thus, v(+)(x, z) must be an increasing function of x at 
x = z, i.e.,  is the first necessary condition.  The other necessary condition 
 then guarantees that the actual bid v(+)(x, x) of firm i is indeed 
higher than the bid v(+)(z, z) of firm m. 
( ) ( ) 0, ≥+ eevx
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, ≥+ ++ eeveev zx
On the other hand, if b(+)(e) = v(+)(e, e) is a strictly increasing bidding function, the 
sufficient condition , which basically is the second-order condition for profit 
maximization, guarantees that a firm has no profitable deviation from b(+)(e). 
( ) 0>+xv
From the point of view of a winning firm i, the types of all other (n - 1) winning 
firms are affiliated even if the types are ex-ante independent.  The degree of this 
affiliation, in general, is determined by firm i’s own type and by the ex-ante distribution 
of types.  In the limit case, when types of all competitors of firm i are perfectly 
correlated, i.e., when  for all k, the partial derivatives of the reduced-form profit 
function 
zek =
π  can be analytically calculated.  This is the content of the following lemma.  
Lemma 1.  In case  for all k, the partial derivatives of the reduced-form profit 
function of firm i 
zek =
( )zee ii ,, −π  at  are: xzee ji ===
( ) 0,, >= ei xxx ππ , 
( ) 0,,
,
, <−=
ii
eij
j xxx
π
ππ
π  and 
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( ) ( )( )( ) iijiii
eijij
z n
n
xxx
,,,
,,
2
1
1
,,
πππ
πππ
π
−+
−
= . 
Lemma 1 turns out to be useful in the rest of this section.  Using a continuity argument, 
it is easy to see that the inequalities 0>π i  and 0<π j  also hold if competitors’ types 
are highly (but not perfectly) correlated, and if x and z are close to each other (but not 
coincide).  Hence, in accordance with Lemma 1, if the ex post correlation of all winning 
firms’ types is large, the direct effect iπ  is always positive, i.e., each firm wants to be 
more efficient, and the indirect strategic effect jπ  is negative, i.e., each firm wants to 
compete with less efficient firms.  It follows that there is a tension in the auction stage 
of the model.  On one hand, the positive direct effect forces a firm to bid higher if the 
firm is more efficient.  On the other hand, the negative strategic effect influences a firm’ 
valuation through the ex post affiliation and forces a firm to bid lower if the firm is 
more efficient. 
An interesting consequence of Lemma 1 is that the auction price w = b(+)(z) cannot 
be considered a sunk cost for a firm in the aftermarket stage, i.e., 0≠zπ .  This is 
because the auction price effects the distribution of firms’ competitors and through their 
aftermarket strategy it indirectly influences a firm’s profits. 
Statistically independent type 
Using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 as a general tool, we now first analyze the case 
where firms’ types are independent.  Let the firms’ efficiency parameters ei be 
identically and independently distributed over a compact and bounded support in 
accordance with an arbitrary twice differentiable distribution function , which 
density is denoted by .  The following proposition states a condition under which 
an increasing equilibrium fails to exist. 
( )xFe
( )xfe
Proposition 2.  If the condition 
( )
( )( )jiii
eij
e n
n
,,
,
1
1
2
ππ
ππ
π
−+
−
<  
holds at eee ji == , then the auction stage does not have a symmetric increasing 
bidding equilibrium. 
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We have argued above that firms’ types (conditional on winning) are ex-post affiliated 
even if the types are ex-ante independent.  Proposition 2 uses the fact that if z is close to 
the upper end of the distribution e , this affiliation is reasonably strong because the 
types of all winning firms will be between z and e .  Together with a sufficiently strong 
strategic effect given by the inequality in Proposition 2, an increasing bidding 
equilibrium fails to exist.5
We will illustrate Proposition 2 by considering some specific functional forms 
under Cournot and differentiated Bertrand competition.  These examples strengthen the 
idea conveyed in this section, namely that if the strategic effect is strong enough a 
symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium fails to exist.  The examples identify 
conditions in terms of demand elasticities and cross-price effects guaranteeing a strong 
enough strategic effect. 
Example 1:  Cournot competition. 
Let firms have constant marginal cost so that the cost function is , 
with 
( ) ( ecqqef −=, )
ec ≥ , and let market demand be characterized by a constant price elasticity r, 
i.e., .  Under Cournot competition, a firm’s profit function becomes rpQ −=
( ) ( ) ( )( )irj jiiii ecqqeqq −−= −− ∑ /1,,π , 
so that equilibrium output levels at ei = ej = e are given by 
( )
( )
r
ji ecnr
nr
n
qqq ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
===
11* .  
Proposition 2 tells us that a sufficient condition for a symmetric increasing bidding 
equilibrium not to exist can be obtained by investigating the partial derivatives of 
the profit function at this point.  One can easily calculate them to be: 
( )
1−
−
−=
nr
ec
jπ , 
( )( )(
( )
)
*, 1
12
nrqnr
ecrnr
ii
−
−+−
−=π , 
( )( )(
( )
)
*, 1
1
nrqnr
ecrnr
ji
−
−+−
−=π , 
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5 One can see that the results of Proposition 1 and 2 also hold true in the full information 
scenario discussed above.  The reason is that under the conditions of Lemma 1, all winning 
firms have the same type, and therefore Lemma 1 holds true in both (full and private) 
informational scenarios.  Consequently, Proposition 2 holds in both settings. 
*qe =π , and 1, =eiπ . 
Substituting these values into the condition of Proposition 2 we get that if 
 a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist.  Thus, if 
demand is relatively inelastic the strategic effect is strong enough to dominate the 
direct effect.  This is quite intuitive as in this case a small reduction in total output 
(due to higher cost) has large price (and thus, profit) effects.  On the other hand, 
we do not want this non-existence result to be driven be by the fact that the market 
stage equilibrium is not well-defined.  It is easy to see that the stability condition 
( 1/2 +< nr )
( ) 0,, <− jiii ππ  that we imposed reduces in this case to , i.e., the price 
elasticity of demand should not be too small.  Consequently, if 
nr /1>
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
∈
1
2,1
nn
r , 
the condition of Proposition 2 as well as the stability assumption mentioned in 
Section 2 are satisfied for any ex-ante independent distribution of types.  Thus, for 
any number of licenses  that are auctioned there exist values of the price 
elasticity of demand such that an increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist.
2≥n
6
Example 2:  Differentiated Bertrand competition. 
If, to the contrary, firms compete in prices with the same cost function as in 
Example 1, and firms’ market demands are linear and given by 
( ) ∑ ≠− +−= ij jiii papppq 1, , 
then the profit function becomes 
( ) ( )( )( )∑ ≠− +−−−= ij jiiiiii papecpepp 1,,π . 
Equilibrium prices at ei = ej = e can be easily calculated to be given by 
( )( ) (( )12/1* −−−−=== naecppp ji ) . 
Again, to invoke Proposition 2 we have to investigate the partial derivatives of the 
profit function π.  One can easily see that at this point they are: 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )12
111
−−
−−−−
=
na
naecajπ , 
                                                                          
)1/2,1/1 +−∈ nn 0, <ji6 In this example, quantities are strategic substitutes if r  as ( ) (( ) π , and are 
strategic complements if  as (( )1/1,/1 −∈ nnr 0, >ji) π . 
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( ) ( )( )
( )( )12
111
−−
−−−−
=
na
naec
eπ , 
2, −=iiπ , aji =,π , and 1, −=eiπ . 
As in Example 1, we need take two constraints into account.  On one hand, 
substituting these values into the condition of Proposition 2 we can check that if 
 a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist.  The 
parameter a measures the strategic effect in this case and this effect must be 
sufficiently strong.  On the other hand, the stability condition 
(( 13/4 −> na ))
( ) 0,, <+∑ ≠ik kiii ππ  
reduces in this case to , i.e., the strategic effect cannot be too large.  
Thus, if 
( 1/2 −< na )
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
∈
1
2,
13
4
nn
a , 
a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist for any ex-ante 
independent distribution of firms’ types.  Again, it is easy to see that for any  
there are parameter values such that this is the case. 
2≥n
Affiliated types 
In the examples above, we have shown that if the strategic effect is stronger than the 
direct effect then for any independent prior distribution of firms’ types, an increasing 
equilibrium does not exist.  It turns out that that even if the strategic effect is weak (but 
still exists) an increasing equilibrium may still fail to exist provided firms’ types are ex-
ante affiliated.7  
In the sequel we consider a market stage with conditions that commonly hold in 
oligopoly markets, namely 0>iπ , i.e., firms prefer being more cost-efficient 
themselves, and 0<jπ , i.e., firms prefer competing with less cost-efficient 
competitors.  For simplicity, we assume that firms’ cost function is given by 
, c ≥ 2, and that all efficiency parameters ej with probability a half are 
uniformly and independently distributed over the range [0, 1], and with probability a 
( ) ( ecqqef −=, )
                                                                          
7 It is easy to see that if the strategic effect is completely absent, i.e., if 0== zj ππ , so that firms have 
local monopolies, the Demsetz monopoly result continues to hold. 
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half they are uniformly and independently distributed over the range [1, 2].  If the type 
of firm i is marginally below 1, i.e., ε−= 1ie  where ε > 0 is small, it expects to 
compete with firms which types are distributed over [1 – ε, 1], in which case: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]( )1,11,,11,11 εεεπεεε −∈−−=−−=−
−
++
ki eeEvb . 
If, on the other hand, the type of firm i is marginally above 1, i.e., ε+= 1ie , the firm 
expects to compete with firms which types are distributed over [1 + ε, 2], in which case: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]( )2,11,,11,11 εεεπεεε +∈++=++=+
−
++
ki eeEvb . 
It is easy to see that the bidding function is discontinuous and actually decreases at 1: 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 02,11,1,11,,111lim
0
<∈−=−−+
−
++
→
ki eeEbb ππεε
ε
, 
due to 0<jπ .  Hence, a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium fails to exist no 
matter how weak the strategic effect is. 
4. On decreasing bidding equilibria 
The analysis in the previous section leads us to a natural question, namely whether there 
exist market structures and types’ distributions, for which not only an increasing 
equilibrium fails to exist, but instead a symmetric decreasing equilibrium does exist.  In 
such an equilibrium, the least-efficient firms always submit the highest bids and obtain 
the licenses to compete in the aftermarket.  In this section, we first argue that the 
strategic effect and ex-ante affiliation of firms’ types are both necessary for a decreasing 
equilibrium to exist.  Next, we provide an example of specific market conditions under 
which a decreasing equilibrium exists. 
When a monotone symmetric equilibrium bidding function is a decreasing 
function, firm’s valuation function v(-)(x, z) must be defined as follows 
( ) ( ) ( )( )lkiii ezexezeeEzxv ≤<=≡ −− ,,,, π . 
The following proposition derives an equilibrium bidding function and necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a symmetric decreasing bidding equilibrium to exist. 
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Proposition 3.  If  and  for all ( ) 0<−xv
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, <+ −− eeveev zx [ ]eee ,∈ , then there exists 
a unique symmetric decreasing bidding equilibrium given by b(-)(e) = v(-)(e, e).  If the 
equilibrium exists, then  and  for all ( )− ( ) ( )−−( ) 0, ≤eevx ( ) ( ) 0,, ≤+ eeveev zx [ ]eee . ,∈
( ) 0<−xv
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and is, therefore, 
omitted.  Consider first the condition .  If firms types are independent, then 
( ) ( ) ( )( )le≤kiix zezexEzxv <≡ −− ,,, π . 
Under the assumption that firms prefer being more cost-efficient themselves we have 
that ( ) 0,, >
−
zex iiπ  and, therefore, v .  Hence, a decreasing equilibrium never 
exists if types are statistically independent. 
( ) 0>−x
If, on the other hand, there is no strategic effect, i.e., 0== zj ππ , and firms have 
local monopolies, we have ( ) ( ) 0, >==− eix zxv .  Hence, also in this case a decreasing 
equilibrium does not exist. 
ππ
In the remaining of this section, we provide an example of market conditions where 
a unique symmetric bidding equilibrium exists that is decreasing.  To this end, we take 
the following distribution F* of firms’ efficiency parameters ej.  Let a macroeconomic 
fundamental (e.g., interest rate, oil price, the growth rate of the economy etc.) β be 
distributed over the interval [0, 1] in accordance with an arbitrary (twice differentiable) 
distribution function ( ) ( )ttF <≡ ββ Pr .  Then, for any given β let all ej be independently 
and uniformly distributed over the interval ( ) ( )[ ]ββ xx , , where ( ) ( )βεβββ −−≡ 1x , 
( ) ( )βεβββ −+≡ 1x , and ( 1,0∈ )ε  is a parameter, i.e., let the conditional distribution 
( ) ( )txetxF je =<≡ βPr  be 
( ) ( )( ) ( )txtx
txxtxFe
−
−
=  for ( ) ( )[ ]txtxx ,∈ . 
The reason why we consider this specific distribution is that for small values of ε, if a 
firm i has a type x, the distribution of types of all other firms conditional on x is 
concentrated on a small neighborhood of x.  Therefore, all firms that are competing in 
the aftermarket have approximately the same type, the Nash equilibrium is almost 
symmetric, and a decreasing equilibrium bidding function can be analytically calculated 
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Figure 1.  Support of the conditional distribution ( ) ( )txetxF je =<= βPr . 
in the limit when ε converges to zero.  Figure 1 shows the support ( ) ( )[ ]txtx ,  of the 
conditional distribution ( )txFe . 
Proposition 4.  Let  firms with constant marginal costs  compete in 
an auction for n licenses, let the winning firms compete in quantities in a market with 
constantly elastic demand Q , and let firms’ efficiency parameters ei be 
distributed in accordance with the distribution F*.  If the price elasticity r satisfies 
1+= nN 0>− iec
r−
= p
( )
233
21
2
2
−+
++
≡<<
nn
nnnrr
n
, 
then there exists an ( ) 0,~ >nrε  so that for all ( )εε ~,0∈  the auction stage has a unique 
symmetric bidding equilibrium that is decreasing. 
In the example considered in Proposition 4, the demand elasticity r must not be too 
small (r > 1/n) in order to ensure that the aftermarket Nash equilibrium exists and is 
stable.  On the other hand, r must be small enough ( ( )nrr < ) so that the strategic effect 
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is sufficiently strong.  The minimum number of licenses for this decreasing equilibrium 
to exists is n = 3. The main reason is that the strategic effect should be strong enough 
and this effect gets stronger, the larger the number of firms competing in the market 
place.8  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this article, we have shown that when multiple licenses are auctioned to firms which 
compete in an aftermarket, these licenses do not have to end up in the hands of the most 
efficient firms.  This implies that auctions may create aftermarket inefficiencies.  The 
main reasons for this result are the presence of an informational externality and the fact 
that rational bidders take a kind of adverse selection or winner’s curse into account.  
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) argue that in case firms’ aftermarket profits depend on 
private information in the hands of other winning firms (in our case cost) there is an 
informational externality.  The kind of adverse selection or winner’s curse that is 
present in our context is that firms prefer to compete with less efficient firms and that 
when the auction selects the most efficient firms, bidding firms have to take this 
selection effect into account.  We have identified conditions under which efficient firms 
downsize their bid so much more than less efficient firms that an increasing bidding 
equilibrium does not exist. 
The model developed in this paper does not fit into the now standard assumptions 
of the affiliated valuation model (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).  An important assumption 
in the affiliated valuation model is that a player’s valuation is an increasing function of 
his own signal as well as of the private signals received by all other players.  In our 
case, where firms receive a signal of their cost parameter, firms’ valuation is an 
increasing function of its own signal, but a decreasing function of the signals of other 
firms.  Moreover, but less important, a firm only cares about the signals received by 
other winning firms. 
In this paper, we have focused our attention only on a standard multi-unit uniform-
price auction.  It can be shown, however, that other simultaneous-bid multi-unit 
                                                                          
8 Formally, the proposition is stated for the case where the number of interested firms is just one more 
than the number of available licenses. This is a technical requirement as otherwise we cannot integrate out 
the expressions in the profit function. 
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auctions, e.g., a pay-your-bid auction, also suffer from aftermarket inefficiency 
provided the strategic effect or the ex-ante types’ correlation is sufficiently strong.  
Firms’ desire to compete with less efficient competitors is responsible for such 
inefficiency. The analysis is much more complicated in case of sequential auctions, 
where licenses are sold one-by-one.  It is easy to see that the last license ends up in 
hands of the most efficient remaining firm.  Nevertheless, the strategic effect might 
create inefficient allocations in selling preceding licenses. 
We have not allowed for resale in this paper.  Resale opens up the possibility that 
in case of an inefficient allocation of licenses, an efficient firm buys a license from a 
less efficient firm.  Such a single transaction would also be mutually beneficial because 
for given competitors’ efficiency levels, an efficient firm makes more profits than a less 
efficient firm does.  However, it is much less clear whether such a transaction is feasible 
in case other firms are also allowed to transact so that a sequential resale market would 
emerge.  Analyzing the model while allowing for reselling turns out to be quite 
complicated.  Apart from the fact that reselling is sometimes not allowed or 
prohibitively costly, there is another good reason not to consider the possibility of 
reselling. For example, in case a decreasing equilibrium exists, n most efficient firms 
together make less profit than n least efficient firms do.  If, together with reselling, we 
allow firms to make side payments to other firms for not selling their licenses, one can 
show that the license holders (together) can “outbid” an offer of a more efficient firm as 
the profits they would loose when this new firm competes in the market are larger than 
the profit the newcomer could make.  Hence, a decreasing bidding equilibrium yields an 
ex-post efficient allocation from the perspective of the coalition of winning firms. 
This paper does not consider the question whether an optimal mechanism exist in 
the present situation.  This is an interesting, but non-trivial, question.  What is clear, 
however, is that the results obtained by Ausubel (2004) do not directly apply, as the 
present model does not satisfy the standard assumptions of the affiliated valuation 
model (as indicated above). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Let us define Z to be the type of the firm that submits the nth 
highest bid amongst all (N - 1) firms other than firm i, i.e., Z is the nth highest order 
statistics among ej, j ≠ i.  We denote the distribution of Z conditional on ei = x by 
( ) ( ) ( )+ ( )xezZxzG i =<= Pr , and the corresponding density function by ( )+ xzg . 
Suppose that all firms other than i follow the bidding function b(+)(e), and Z takes a 
value z.  We consider a firm i, which has a cost parameter ei = x and which bids b(+)(y).  
If y < z, firm i looses the auction and receives no profit.  If, on the other hand, y > z, firm 
i gets a license at the auction price , which yields the conditional expected 
profit  to firm i.  The unconditional expected profit of a firm with cost 
parameter x and a bid b(+)(y) is 
( ) ( )zbw +=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zbzxv ++ −,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )∫
<
++++
−=
yz
dzxzgzbzxvyxV ,, . 
Maximizing  with respect to y yields the first-order condition 
, i.e., .  The necessary second-order condition in this 
case can be written as .  Finally,  is an increasing 
function only if . 
( ) ( yxV ,+ )
) )
)
) )
( yxx
y
,maxarg= ( ) ( ) ( ) ( xxvxb ,++ =
( ) ( ) 0, ≥+ xxvx ( ) ( ) ( ) ( xxvxb ,++ =
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, ≥+ ++ xxvxxv zx
Suppose now that  and .  In order to check that 
 is indeed an optimal bid, we evaluate  for any 
y ≠ x: 
( ) 0>+xv
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, >+ ++ xxvxxv zx
( ) ( ) ( ) ( xxvxb ,++ = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( yxVxxV ,, ++ −
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
,,,,
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
−=−
∫ ∫
∫
++
<<
+++++
x
y
x
z
x
xzy
dzxzgdtztv
dzxzgzzvzxvyxVxxV
 
This shows that firm i has no profitable deviations. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 1.  If a firm i gets a license, has a type ei = x, and chooses si, whereas 
all its competitors have the same type z, the market profit of firm i can be written as 
follows: 
( )( )zexeessE kiiii ==− ,,,π . 
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Maximizing this expression with respect to si yields the following first-order condition: 
( )( ) ( )( )xszxszexeessE iikiiiii ,,,,,,0 *** −− ==== ππ . 
Differentiating it with respect to x and z, taking into account that firm i is of type x and 
all other firms are of type z and choose , and evaluating the resulting 
expression at z = x yields: 
( zzssk ,* = )
eiii e
s
,,0 ππ +∂
∂
=  and 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
−+
∂
∂
=
z
s
e
sn
z
s
jiii ,, 10 ππ . 
Solving them together provides us with the following partials of the Nash equilibrium 
strategy  at z = x: ( zxs , )
ii
ei
e
s
,
,
π
π
−=
∂
∂  and 
( )
( )( ) iijiii
eiji
n
n
z
s
,,,
,,
1
1
πππ
ππ
−+
−
=
∂
∂ . 
Then, substituting these expressions into ( ) jj es ππ ∂∂= /  and ( )( ) jz zsn ππ ∂∂−= /1  
finally yields 
( ) 0,, >= ei xxx ππ , 
( ) 0,,
,
, <−=
ii
eij
j xxx
π
ππ
π  and 
( ) ( )( )( ) iijiii
eijij
z n
n
xxx
,,,
,,
2
1
1
,,
πππ
πππ
π
−+
−
= . 
In quantity competition settings it is 0<jπ  and 0, >eiπ  whereas in price competition for 
substitutes it is 0>jπ  and 0, <eiπ .  Therefore, ( ) 0,, >xxxzπ  when s are strategic 
substitutes ( 0, >jiπ ), and ( ) 0,, <xxxzπ  when s are strategic complements ( 0, <jiπ ). ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 2.  We will show that under the condition of the proposition, the 
necessary existence condition  for an increasing equilibrium fails 
at 
( )( ) ( )( )++ 0,, ≥+ eeveev zx
ee = .  To this end, we first calculate firms’ aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy 
( ) ( )ees ,  and its partial derivatives.  Then, we calculate firms’ valuation function ( )+ eev ,  
and its partial derivatives. 
In the limit when ( ) ( eezx ,, → ) ), the Nash equilibrium strategy  can be 
written as 
( zxs ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )210, szesxeszxs −−−−= , where 
( ) ( )eess ,0 ≡ , 
( ) ( ee
x
ss ,1
∂
∂
≡ ) , and 
( ) ( )ee
z
ss ,2
∂
∂
≡ . 
Dropping arguments in all functions evaluated at ( ) ( eezx ,, = ), the first-order condition 
( )( kliiiii ezexeessE <≤== − ,,,0 **π ) for independent types in the first-order 
approximation becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )zes
ze
ezeeE
snsxes
ezxeszeseenszesxeE
kk
ezjiiieiiii
keijikiii
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
<−
+−+−−+−=
<−−−+−−−−+−−=
↑
12
,
2
,,
1
,
,,
21
,
21
lim1
10
πππππ
ππππ
 
At ( ) ( eezx ,, = ), the first-order condition implies iπ=0 .  Then, denoting 
( )
ze
ezeeE
E kk
ez
−
<−
≡
↑
lim~ , 
the first-order condition implies the following two equations determining  and : ( )1s ( )2s
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
+−+=
+=
12
,
2
,
,
1
,
~10
0
sEsns
s
jiii
eiii
ππ
ππ
. 
Solving this system yields 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−+
−
=
−=
E
n
n
s
s
jiiiii
eiji
ii
ei
~
1
1
,,,
,,2
,
,1
πππ
ππ
π
π
 
Hence, firms’ valuation function  in the limit ( )( )( zxv ,+ ) ( eezx ,, = ) can be written as 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ejiii
eij
ej
kejk
xeze
n
En
xezessEn
ezxeszeseenEzxv
π
ππ
ππ
π
πππ
πππ
−−−
−+
−
+=
−−−+−−=
<−−−+−−−=+
,,
,
21
21
1
~1
~1
1,
 
Finally, the necessary condition  for an increasing equilibrium to 
exist fails at 
( )( ) ( )( ) 0,, ≥+ ++ eeveev zx
ee =  if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )jiii
eij
ezx n
En
eeveev
,,
,
1
~1
,,0
ππ
ππ
π
−+
−
−=+> ++ . 
In accordance with Lemma 1, 0, <eijππ .  Hence, the above inequality can be written as 
( )( )
( ) eij
jiiie
n
n
E
,
,,
1
1~
ππ
πππ
−
−+
> . 
Calculating E~  yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 21'2lim1limlim~ ≥−−−=
−
−
=
−
<−
=
↑↑↑ ∫
∫
zfzezf
zf
dxxfze
dxxfxe
ze
ezeeE
E
ee
e
eze
z
e
e
z
e
ez
kk
ez
. 
The last inequality holds as an equality if ( ) 0>↑ ezfe , and as a strict inequality if 
( ) 0=↑ ezfe  (so that ( ) 0' ≤↑ ezfe ).  Therefore, the necessary existence condition fails 
if 
( )
( )( )jiii
eij
e n
n
,,
,
1
1
2
ππ
ππ
π
−+
−
< . 
This ends the proof. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 4.  First, we derive firms’ aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy, 
which we denote by ( )ε;, zxs
( )
 to emphasize its dependence on ε, under the assumption 
that in the auction stage all they follow an increasing bidding function b(+)(e).  Under the 
assumption that the profit function π is twice continuously differentiable, ε;, zxs  is 
continuously differentiable with respect to all its argument, and we represent it as a 
first-order Tailor expansion.  We show that this bidding function b(+)(e) does not satisfy 
the second order condition, hence, an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium does 
not exist.  Second, we repeat the previous exercise for a decreasing bidding function 
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b(-)(e) and analyze conditions under which b(-)(e) is indeed an equilibrium bidding 
function. 
From now on we denote by x a type of a firm i.  Types of all other (winning and 
loosing) firms are ej, (ek and el = z respectively), and we define 
( ) ελ /xejj −≡ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )εεεε 2/411 2 ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+−+≡ xxt  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( εεεε 2/141 2 ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−+−≡ xxt ) , 
so that for any : [ ]1,0∈x
( )( xtxx ≡ ) and ( )( )xtxx ≡ . 
Thus, for given x, conditional distribution ( ) ( xetxtF i =<≡ ββ Pr ) has the support 
[ ( ) ( )xtxt , ], and conditional distribution ( ) ( xexF ije =<≡ λλλ Pr ) has the support 
[ ( ) ( )xx λλ , ], where both ( )xλ  and ( )xλ  are bounded:9
( ) ( ) ( ) 5.01/ −≥−−−= ttxtx ελ  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 5.01/ ≤−+−= ttxtx ελ . 
Denoting ( )ε;, zxs  itself and its partial derivatives evaluated at  as ( )0;, xx
( )( ) ( )0;,0 xxsxs ≡ , 
( )( ) ( )0;,1 xx
x
sxs
∂
∂
≡ , 
( )( ) ( 0;,2 xx
z
sxs
∂
∂
≡ ) , and 
( )( ) ( )0;,3 xxsxs
ε∂
∂
≡ , 
allows ( )ε;, zxs  and ( )ε;, zes j  to be written in the first-order approximation as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ελε 320;, ssszxs z ++=  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ελλε 3210;, sssszes zjj +++= . 
Dropping arguments lists in all functions evaluated at z = x, we write the first-order 
condition 
                                                                          
9 These inequalities can be obtained by minimizing ( )xλ  and maximizing ( )xλ  with respect to x. 
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( ) ( )( )( )kliii ezexeezeszxsE <=== ,,,;,,;,0 1 Kεεπ  
as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ελπλπππ
λλπλπεπ
ελλελπ
ε
klikjizjiiii
klizk kjiziii
klizzi
ezexeEsnssn
ezexessnsssE
ezexexsssssssE
<==−++−++=
<==+−++++=
<==+++++=
→
∑
,lim11
,1
,,,,0
0
1
,
32
,,
321
,
32
,
321
1
0320 K
 
Let, first, 0=ε .  In this case, the first-order condition implies iπ=0 , which for a given 
profit function 
( ) ( )( )irj jiiii ecssess +−= −− ∑ /1,,π  
yields the symmetric aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy (see section 3): 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
r
xcnr
nr
n
sxxs ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
==
110;, 0 . 
In this case 
( ) ( )
( )1
0
−
−
=
nr
sxc
π , 
( )
( )1−
−
−=
nr
xc
jπ , 
( )( )(
( ) ( )
)
0, 1
12
nrsnr
xcrnr
ii
−
−+−
−=π , 
( )( )(
( ) ( )
)
0, 1
1
nrsnr
xcrnr
ji
−
−+−
−=π , and 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )xc
rsss
−
=+
0
21 . 
Using iπ=0 , we rewrite the first-order condition for 0≠ε  and 0=zλ  as follows: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ε
πππ
ε
xezexeeE
snsn klikjijiii
−<==
−+−+=
→
,
lim110
0
1
,
3
,, , 
so that 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
εππ
π
ε
xxxHs
n
n
s
jiii
ji −
−+
−
−=
+
→
,lim
1
1
0
1
,,
,3 , 
where we defined functions 
( )( ) ( )klik ezzexeeEzxH ±<±==≡± ,,, . 
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Properties of  are derived in the following lemma, which is proven after the 
proof of the proposition. 
( )( zxH ,± )
( )( )zxH ,±
Lemma 2.  Let ei be distributed in accordance with the distribution function F*.  Then, 
 for small ε can be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )εε on
xnx
n
znnxzxH +
+
−±
+
++
=
±
1
1
12
2, , 
Using Lemma 2, we rewrite  as follows: ( )3s
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )1,,
,3
11
11
s
nn
xxnn
s
jiii
ji
ππ
π
−++
−−
−=  
Plugging this expression into the first-order condition yields: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )1,,
,
0
1
,,
,2
112
12
1,1
lim
11
1
s
nn
nn
xz
xnxxezexeeEn
s
nn
n
s
jiii
ji
klik
jiii
ji
ππ
π
ε
ππ
π
ε
−++
−+
−=
−
−−−<==+
−++
−
−=
→
 
Solving  together with the above expressions for  and  
finally yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( xcrsss −=+ /021 ) ( )2s ( )3s
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0,,
,,1
112
112
s
nnnxc
nnr
s
jiii
jiii
ππ
ππ
−++−
−++
= , 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0,,
,2
112
12
s
nnnxc
nnr
s
jiii
ji
ππ
π
−++−
−+
−= , and 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0,,
,3
112
112
s
nnnxc
xxnrn
s
jiii
ji
ππ
π
−++−
−−
−= . 
Hence, the aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy ( )ε;, zxs  for small ε and (z – x) is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0,,
,
112
1221
1;, s
nnnxc
xnxxznnr
zxs
jiii
ji
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−++−
−+−+−
−=
ππ
επ
ε . 
This ends the analysis of the aftermarket stage of the game. 
In order show that an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium does not exist for 
small ε, we calculate firms’ valuation function , and verify that for given 
parameters’ restrictions, .  Using the first-order approximation for 
( ) ( ε;, zxv + )
)
( ) ( ) 00;, <+ xxvx
( ε;, zxs , firms’ valuation function  in the first-order approximation can be 
written as follows: 
( ) ( ε;, zxv + )
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Substituting expressions for π, πj, πi,i, πi,j, and  finally yields the following valuation 
function : 
( )0s
( ) ( )ε;, zxv +
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) (( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (( )( )
)
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1
1
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But then 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 02111132
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1
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−
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−
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rrnrnnrxcn
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r
x , 
provided ( )nrr < .  This implies that  for sufficiently small (but strictly 
positive) ε, so that an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium does not exist. 
( ) ( ) 0;, <+ εxxvx
Suppose now that there exists a symmetric decreasing equilibrium bidding function 
b(-)(e).  In a similar way as above, firms’ valuation function  can be written 
as follows: 
( )( ε;, zxv − )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (( )( )) ⎟⎟⎠
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But then 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 02111132
23321
1
0;, 22
221
<
+−+−+++−
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for ( )nrr < , and 
( )( ) ( )( )
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By continuity argument, there exists an 0~ >ε  so that  and  
for all 
( )( ) 0;, <− εzxvx ( )( ) 0;, <− εzxvz
( )εε ~,0∈  and feasible z.  Therefore, the proposed function  is 
indeed decreasing and is a unique symmetric equilibrium bidding function. ■ 
( )( ) ( )( xxvxb ,−− = )
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Proof of Lemma 2.  We denote distribution functions as follows: 
( ) ( )ttF <≡ ββ Pr , 
( ) ( zexezxF kie ><≡ ,Pr, ) , and 
( ) ( )tzexetzxF kie =><≡ β,Pr, , 
and the corresponding densities be 
( ) ( ) 1/ =≡ dxtdFtf ββ , 
( ) ( ) dxzxdFzxf ee /,, ≡ , and 
( ) ( ) dxtzxdFtzxf ee /,, ≡ . 
As ( ) ( )( ββ xxUei ,~ ), it follows that for ( ) ( )[ ]txtxx ,∈ : 
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And, therefore, 
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Hence, 
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where t  and t  are as defined in Proof of Proposition 4. 
We define ( )( ) ( tezexeeEtzxH klik =<==≡+ β,,,, )~  and consider two cases. 
a) When xz ≥ , ( )( ) ( )( )ztxtzxH +=+ 21,,~  for ( ) ( )( xtztt ,∈ ) ).  Hence,  can be 
written as 
( )( zxH ,+
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( zxQzxPezexezxHEzxH kli ,/,,,, )~, 11=<=== ++ ββ , where 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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b) When xz ≤ , ( )( ) ( )( )ztxtzxH +=+ 21,,~  for ( ) ( )( )ztxtt ,∈  and ( )( ) ttzxH =+ ,,~  for 
( ) ( )( )xtztt ,∈ .  Hence,  can be written as ( )( zxH ,+ )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( zxQzxPezexezxHEzxH kli ,/,,,, )~, 22=<=== ++ ββ , where 
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In order to evaluate  and its partials for small values of ε we use the 3rd-order 
approximation 
( )( zxH ,+ )
( )33121111 εεεεε o++−+=+ 1682 , so that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )3322 21121212141 εεεεεε oxxxxxxx +−−+−+−+=+− , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )3322 21121212141 εεεεεε oxxxxxxx +−−−−+−−=−+ . 
Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )222111 εεε oxxxxxxxt +−−+−+= , ( ) ( )11' oxt += , 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )222111 εεε oxxxxxxxt +−−+−−= , and ( ) ( )11' oxt += , 
The uniform convergence with respect to ( ) ( 1,0,0 ⊂∈ εε ) of the limits 
( ) ( )
( )ε−=−
−
=
→→ 1
1
1
1limlim
10 x
xt
x
xt
xx
, and ( ) ( ) ( )ε+=−
−
=
→→ 1
1
1
1limlim
10 x
xt
x
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xx
, 
implies the following expressions for t  and t : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )εεε oxxxxxt +−+−+= 2111 , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )εεε oxxxxxt +−−−−= 2111 . 
We consider cases xz ≥  and xz ≤  separately. 
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a) Let xz ≥ .  Using the above Tailor expansions yields 
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Hence, 
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b) Let xz ≤ .  As  and , it follows that 
.  Similarly, as , , 
, and  at , it follows that 
 and . 
( ) ( xxPxxP ,, 12 = ) )
)
)
)
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )112/, onnxxHx ++=+ ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )112/2, onnxxH z +++=+
( ) ( xxQxxQ ,, 12 =
( )( ) ( )( 0,0, +=− ++ xxHxxH xPxP ∂∂=∂∂ // 12 zPzP ∂∂=∂∂ // 12
xQxQ ∂∂=∂∂ // 12 zQzQ ∂∂=∂∂ // 12 ( xx,
( )( ) ( )( )0,0, +=− ++ xxHxxH xx ( )( ) ( )( )0,0, +=− ++ xxHxxH zz
Thus at ,  is continuously differentiable with the partials 
 and  and, therefore, can 
be written as 
( )xx, ( )( zxH ,+
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )εε on
xnx
n
znnxzxH +
+
−
+
+
++
=
+
1
1
12
2, . 
The expression for ( )−H  immediately follows from  ■ ( )( ) ( )( )zxHzxH −−−= +− 1,11, .
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